股神減持中石油是錯不了的。巴非特的新主張一書提到，當價值投資者離場，泡沫離爆破之時就大概不遠了......
當我打開中國遠洋（1919）的圖表一看，就更肯定個別中資股已形成泡沫。在我印象中，沒有什麼股票可以在一年之内上升10倍吧，113倍的市盈率不是泡沫是什麼呀？更何況一支航運股根本就談不上有投資的價值。
無論是因為是市場解讀自由行資金會繼續推高港股（熱錢本來就來去自如，來得快，走得更快），還是股民認為中央政府或金管局會隨時入場托市（中移動難道就未試過爆破嗎？），還是什麼08奧運泡沫才會爆破之說，都只是一廂情願的想法而已！
只是令我不解的是，除了一堆優點説不上很強的中資股被相中之外，連真正有投資價值的港交所也被炒到天o甘高，那才叫做觸目驚心！（什麼與内地交易所接軌而有必要增持之類的理由，聽起來都像屁話，港交所本來就跟一個公營部門沒啥分別，根本就輪不到外資大股東左右大局。）
連恆生銀行都有得升，但滙豐銀行就偏偏原地踏步，實在摸不着頭腦啊！
大家又在大玩博傻理論了，只是以往由外資呼風喚雨的時代，這次由内地資金接力而已......在一個沒有金本位的年代，資金泛濫是必然的結果，是弱美元所致，還是濫發人民幣的結果？學曹仁超講，木宰羊。
總而言之，泡沫都會有爆破的一天，只是看看誰是那個不幸的博傻而已......
http://udn.com/NEWS/FINANCE/FINS2/4047555.shtml
香港恆生指數近期劇烈波動，外界解讀，這是大陸股民趁著長假，齊赴香港炒股導致。有專家指出，港股和A股連動現象，愈來愈明顯，但「港股A股化」後，卻不利港股正常發展。
香港恆生指數近日大幅波動，甚至還在同一天內演出指數來回差距千點等大波動現象。昨（9）日一早，恆生指數彈上27,838點，隨後迅速回跌到27,492點，但下午卻立刻漲回28,228點，以上漲458點作收。
但美國「股神」巴菲特昨天再賣中石油的股票，持股由6.49%降到5.44%。這是今年7月以來，他第六度出脫中石油天然氣的持股。
新華社報導指出，十一黃金周期間，大陸A股有九天不開市，但港股交易火爆，恆生指數不僅首次突破28,000點大關，還發生瞬間爆發的網上交易高峰，令滙豐和恒生銀行的網上理財服務系統癱瘓近四小時。
隨後恆生指數一路暴起暴落，但交易量始終並未衰退，因此有外界認為，港股大幅波動，和一些大陸游資趁著長假，南下香港炒股有關。
這些股民買賣港股手法，和炒賣A股相當接近。由於多數大陸居民投資港股，都是採用網上交易模式，也間接證明，這些股民和滙豐、恒生銀行網路癱瘓，難脫關係。
獨立經濟學家謝國忠發出警告指出，近幾個月來，累積升幅驚人的大陸及香港股市已明顯出現泡沫，情況較1997年要更為嚴重。他認為，A股市場有可能面臨急跌，和大陸股市關聯性日深的香港股市，也會受到牽連。
摩根大通上周的研究報告，同樣預警了香港股市的泡沫情況。大陸社科院金融所研究員易憲容表示，近一段時間來，香港股市開始A股化的跡象，都表明，大陸股民操縱炒作現象已開始蔓延到香港。任何一條消息就能夠讓香港股市大起大跌。
他認為，港股A股化，對香港經濟的發展相當不利，為了不讓港股A股化，就得讓香港的市場經濟原則、法律制度、信用合約精神湧向大陸市場，透過市場法則來幫助及影響大陸股市發展，而不是反之遭到A股化。
2007年10月12日星期五
2007年10月4日星期四
So what is inflation?
Inflation is a decline in the monetary standard, according to Robert Mundell.
By this definition, inflation is not measured by rising price indices, nor is deflation measured by falling price indices.
The central function of money was as a standard unit of account. The decline in a standard reflects not its rise or fall in value but its deteriorating stability, credibility, and constancy.
Check out Jude Wanniski's teaching.
http://wanniski.com/defmonster.asp
By this definition, inflation is not measured by rising price indices, nor is deflation measured by falling price indices.
The central function of money was as a standard unit of account. The decline in a standard reflects not its rise or fall in value but its deteriorating stability, credibility, and constancy.
Check out Jude Wanniski's teaching.
http://wanniski.com/defmonster.asp
2007年10月3日星期三
Party Like It's 1999?
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/434df73c-714b-11dc-98fc-0000779fd2ac.html
Excerpts
Recent history, in turn, suggests that such "emergency" rate cuts by the Fed have the effect of inflating asset price bubbles. That is potentially great news for equity investors.
In October 1998, when the Fed under Alan Greenspan was forced to cut the Fed funds rate to bring back liquidity to the markets after the near-meltdown of the Long-Term Capital Management hedge fund, the result was also to stimulate markets that had not needed the help. Large technology stocks, and the growing wave of dotcoms, were the greatest beneficiaries. The Nasdaq Composite index gained 40 per cent in three months, and tripled in less than 18 months as it roared through 1999. This helps explain why many in the market now refer to stocks as "partying like it's 1999".
There is another example. In 1987, after Alan Greenspan's Fed cut rates to avert a crisis in the wake of the Black Monday stock market crash, the response was again a bubble. That time, however, it was in Japanese stocks, which more than doubled in the two years after Black Monday, before beginning a long drawn-out collapse.
"This is a classic event, which happens every decade. You have the Fed tightening, then there's some kind of crisis, and then the Fed bails out, and when they do there's another leg up for someone," says Nick Raich, director of equity research at National City bank in Cleveland. "Each time it's a different sector than it was in the previous decade."
Traders know that both these incidents created bubbles that eventually burst. But they also know that in both 1998 and 1987, the euphoria created by the rate cuts lasted more than a year - plenty of time to make strong short-term profits.
Teun Draaisma, European equity strategist at Morgan Stanley, advocated selling in June, and then aggressively re-entering the market in August, for exactly these reasons. He says another "equity mania" is possible, with retail investors piling in and companies indulging in strategic mergers and deals. "If we are right, then equities could be set for a big, big rally," he says. "Bulls will say that this uptrend is unbreakable after all the trouble that has been thrown at it. Emerging markets will be seen as the new growth engine that cannot be derailed."
He also predicts that the episode will "end in tears" - but that still leaves time for investors to make fat profits in the interim.
As everyone is working on the same assumptions, gains could be limited this time. Tobias Levkovich, US equity strategist at Citigroup, who has been strongly optimistic on the market for most of this year, sounds a note of caution. "As most investors are now searching for performance data on past beneficiaries of Fed actions," he says, "we suspect some 'institutional herding' may arbitrage away much of the opportunity fairly quickly."
The Fed itself is also acutely conscious of what happened in 1999. If crisis in the money markets is indeed averted, the Bernanke Fed might well move much quicker than the Greenspan Fed did to raise rates and avert the risk of a big bubble.
Excerpts
Recent history, in turn, suggests that such "emergency" rate cuts by the Fed have the effect of inflating asset price bubbles. That is potentially great news for equity investors.
In October 1998, when the Fed under Alan Greenspan was forced to cut the Fed funds rate to bring back liquidity to the markets after the near-meltdown of the Long-Term Capital Management hedge fund, the result was also to stimulate markets that had not needed the help. Large technology stocks, and the growing wave of dotcoms, were the greatest beneficiaries. The Nasdaq Composite index gained 40 per cent in three months, and tripled in less than 18 months as it roared through 1999. This helps explain why many in the market now refer to stocks as "partying like it's 1999".
There is another example. In 1987, after Alan Greenspan's Fed cut rates to avert a crisis in the wake of the Black Monday stock market crash, the response was again a bubble. That time, however, it was in Japanese stocks, which more than doubled in the two years after Black Monday, before beginning a long drawn-out collapse.
"This is a classic event, which happens every decade. You have the Fed tightening, then there's some kind of crisis, and then the Fed bails out, and when they do there's another leg up for someone," says Nick Raich, director of equity research at National City bank in Cleveland. "Each time it's a different sector than it was in the previous decade."
Traders know that both these incidents created bubbles that eventually burst. But they also know that in both 1998 and 1987, the euphoria created by the rate cuts lasted more than a year - plenty of time to make strong short-term profits.
Teun Draaisma, European equity strategist at Morgan Stanley, advocated selling in June, and then aggressively re-entering the market in August, for exactly these reasons. He says another "equity mania" is possible, with retail investors piling in and companies indulging in strategic mergers and deals. "If we are right, then equities could be set for a big, big rally," he says. "Bulls will say that this uptrend is unbreakable after all the trouble that has been thrown at it. Emerging markets will be seen as the new growth engine that cannot be derailed."
He also predicts that the episode will "end in tears" - but that still leaves time for investors to make fat profits in the interim.
As everyone is working on the same assumptions, gains could be limited this time. Tobias Levkovich, US equity strategist at Citigroup, who has been strongly optimistic on the market for most of this year, sounds a note of caution. "As most investors are now searching for performance data on past beneficiaries of Fed actions," he says, "we suspect some 'institutional herding' may arbitrage away much of the opportunity fairly quickly."
The Fed itself is also acutely conscious of what happened in 1999. If crisis in the money markets is indeed averted, the Bernanke Fed might well move much quicker than the Greenspan Fed did to raise rates and avert the risk of a big bubble.
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